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T
he 1951 Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord marked the birth of the
modern Fed. However, that fact became apparent only in retrospect.
The language of the announcement that accompanied the Accord left
unresolved the issues that had created the discord between the Treasury and
Fed in the ﬁrst place. It read:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full accord
with respect to debt-management and monetary policies to be pursued
in furthering their common purpose to assure the successful ﬁnancing
of the Government’s requirements and, at the same time, to minimize
monetization of the public debt.1
ThisstatementleftunsaidhowtheFedandtheTreasurywouldreconcilethese
conﬂicting goals.
William McChesney Martin, who became FOMC Chairman at the time
of the Accord, created the idea of a modern central bank. Speciﬁcally, he
made macroeconomic stabilization the rationale for central bank indepen-
dence. Martin put this ideal into practice in three ways. First, as summarized
in his phrase “leaning against the wind,” he developed the practice of moving
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short-term interest rates in a way intended to mitigate cyclical ﬂuctuations
and maintain price stability. Second, he helped to create a viable free mar-
ket in government securities whose stability did not require Fed intervention.
Third, he reinvigorated the original structure of the Federal Reserve System
by moving monetary policy decisionmaking out of an Executive Committee
and into the Federal Open Market Committee where all the Board governors
and regional Bank presidents could participate fully.
1. CREATING THE MODERN FED
Before the Accord, the New York Fed had run the market for government
securities with an iron ﬁst. A government securities dealer who wanted to
changethepriceofagovernmentbondbyevenaminusculefractionalamount
would call Robert G. Rouse (head of the Fed’s NewYork Trading Desk) for
permission, and Rouse would probably say no. With the exception of a few
academics at places like the University of Chicago, people could not imagine
the Treasury placing the huge amount of debt created during the war without
the assistance of the Fed. Board economists and policymakers, however,
realized that the only way to avoid continued pressure by the Treasury on the
Fed would be to make completely clear that the Fed would not intervene to
control bond prices.2
UndertheleadershipofChairmanMartin, theFedworkedhardtodevelop
an independent government securities market. During the summer of 1951,
Fed staff including Leach held a series of meetings at the Federal Reserve
Board with each of the government securities dealers. All 12 regional Fed
Bank presidents plus members of the Board of Governors were invited to
these sessions. The main purpose of the sessions was to ascertain the dealers’
ability to support a free market in government securities. With some of the
larger ﬁrms, Fed staff also explored the possibility of organizing the dealers
into a self-governing association that would set minimum capital standards
and assure low trading spreads.
During 1951, Leach made a number of visits to the New York Trading
Deskandlistenedtodealers’questionsandtraders’replies. Indiscussionswith
the traders he tried to explain that continued market intervention by the Fed
prevented the development of a strong market. He felt that each intervention
by the Fed simply caused buyers and sellers to pull away from the market and
wait for the Fed’s next move.
As long as the Fed’s New York Trading Desk was pegging the price of
government securities, there was no need for the market to develop the capac-
ity to smooth price ﬂuctuations. Dealers did not take speculative positions.
2 In addition to Winﬁeld Rieﬂer, the Board staff economists who advocated a free market in
government securities included the long-time Fed economists Woodlief Thomas and Ralph Young
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People extrapolated from that situation and concluded that, without regular
Fed intervention, the government securities market would exhibit destabiliz-
ing price swings. In contrast, the Board staff believed that the market, if left
alone, would work.3
On a trip to the New York Desk in early 1953, Leach was vigorously
pushing his free market ideas with two of the traders. Suddenly, they broke
intobroadsmileswhilelookingoverhishead. Leachturnedaroundandfound
thatAllanSproul, PresidentoftheNewYorkFed, hadjoinedthegroup. Leach
was happily surprised when Sproul invited him to lunch. By this time Leach
felt that he and Sproul were quite good friends and hoped that Sproul, one of
the most admired ﬁnancial leaders in the world, felt the same.
Sproul opened the luncheon conversation by reminding Leach that since
itsfoundingtheFederalReserveSystemhadalwayshaditsfocalpointinNew
York, the ﬁnancial capital of the United States and now of the world. He went
on to predict that Leach would be leaving his present job soon and would end
up with a major bank dealer in New York. “When that happens,” he asked
Leach,“wouldyoustillwantNewYorktooccupythatposition?” Heindicated
that the next phase of the discussions at FOMC meetings might change that
status.
As evidenced by Sproul’s comments, fundamental economic and institu-
tional issues lay behind the debate over how best to encourage a competitive
marketforgovernmentsecurities. Theeconomicissuewaswhethertheimple-
mentation of monetary policy required continuous monitoring of the money
market and oversight over the entire term structure of interest rates. If so, then
the institutional issue should be decided in favor of the New York Fed; that
is, the Open Market Desk should report to the president of the NewYork Fed,
who could continuously monitor its activities. NewYork would then retain its
historic role as the center of gravity of the Federal Reserve System.
The Board view was that the money market did not require continuous
monitoring. Market forces should determine bond yields and the term struc-
ture. TheOpenMarketDeskcouldconﬁneitsoperationstoTreasurybillsand
need only report at regular intervals to the full FOMC in Washington. The
center of gravity of the Federal Reserve System could reside in Washington
with the full FOMC.
These views pitted President Sproul against Chairman Martin. Martin
advocated the policy that the markets would call “bills only.” By buying and
selling only Treasury bills, the Fed would exert its inﬂuence only over the
short-term end of the government securities market. The full FOMC could
3 Leach had graduated with an A.B. degree from the University of Chicago in 1938. At that
time, Chicago had two of the great economists of the twentieth century, Frank Knight and Jacob
Viner. Even at the height of the recession, they and other Chicago economists had retained a
belief in free markets. Leach had absorbed that belief and made use of it while at the Board to
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then oversee this limited intervention from Washington. Furthermore, the
manager of the Fed’s New York Trading Desk could report directly to the
FOMC rather than to the president and directors of the New York Fed. As
Leach’s conversation with Sproul made clear, resolution of this operational
issue would decide the broad issues of the character of the Federal Reserve
System.
The operational issue came to a head over the seemingly technical in-
structions the FOMC issued to the New York Trading Desk in the directive
to guide its purchases and sales of government securities. After the Accord,
the directive had included a reference to “maintaining orderly conditions in
the Government securities market.” The FOMC had regularly authorized a
very high level of funds for possible Desk intervention. One of the ﬁrst post-
Accord moves by the FOMC was to reduce the level of funds authorized for
use by the New York Desk. Although this action limited the extent of Desk
interventions, the Desk retained more latitude for market tinkering than the
free market group at the Board felt was desirable. NewYork argued that even
atinypricedropcouldquicklydevelopintoadisorderlymarketandcontinued
to intervene on that theory. After ten years of quick intervention in response
to very small price changes, the Desk could not discard the habit.
TheBoardstaffarguedforamarketingovernmentsecuritiescharacterized
by “depth, breadth, and resilience.”4 Buttressed by the staff, the FOMC made
a truly basic change. In the March 4–5, 1953, directive, the FOMC dropped
the phrase “maintaining orderly conditions” and substituted “correcting a dis-
orderly situation.” Furthermore, the FOMC instructed the Desk to conﬁne
its operations “to the short end of the market.” The FOMC stated, “It is not
now the policy of the Committee to support any pattern of prices and yields in
the government securities market.” This step, the Board staff thought, should
ﬁnally settle the debate over whether the New York Fed should intervene to
inﬂuence the entire term structure of interest rates.
JustbeforetheJune11, 1953, FOMCmeeting, PresidentSproulcaucused
with the regional Bank presidents at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
With their support, at the June 11 meeting, Sproul succeeded in rescinding the
actions of the March 4–5 FOMC meeting. His position was that if necessary
the Desk should transact in “the long-term market” so as to put reserves “in
where the pressures were greatest” (1953 Annual Report, p. 96). However,
at the September 24, 1953, FOMC meeting, the Committee returned to the
restriction that the Desk conﬁne its operations to Treasury bills.5
4 Leach asked Winﬁeld Rieﬂer how he came up with those terms. He told Leach that he had
trouble remembering names, so he used the initials of his son, Donald B. Rieﬂer [as a mnemonic
device].
5 Martin prevailed in the September 24 meeting with the help of two governors who had not
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Sproul was a redoubtable opponent. He decried the attempt to write a
“constitution”thatwouldnotleavetheFOMC“freetouseitsjudgment”(1953
Annual Report, p. 100). According to Sproul, the exercise of monetary policy
required that the Fed inﬂuence the psychology of the ﬁnancial markets. The
policymaker should exercise that judgment in an ongoing way in response to
changing developments. Sproul’s (1980, p. 10) view that an understanding of
monetary policy derives from an understanding of the psychology of ﬁnancial
markets appears in a letter that he wrote to Robert Roosa:6
[Bryan] has a strong tendency toward cosmic thinking and metaphysical
roundabouts. Beneath all of the wordy embroidery he is really distrustful
of the money market and people who operate it....This is a legacy,
perhaps, of a fundamentalist religious slant as bent and twisted by the
University of Chicago, but it is also a consequence of his having had no
experience in a money market.
ConﬁningDeskoperationstoshort-termgovernmentsecuritiesputthefree
marketforcesatasemanticdisadvantage. Whilenopublicannouncementwas
made of the new limitation until the release of the directive the following year
in the Board’s Annual Report, knowledge of it gradually leaked into market
discussions. Themarketadoptedthephrase“billsonly”todescribethepolicy.
Possibly with a little help from the NewYorkTrading Desk, the market seized
on the opportunity afforded by a then current advertisement for a deodorant.
The letters “B.O.” became a byword of market commentators. Nevertheless,
the restriction remained.
OnJune22,1955,theFOMCabolishedtheExecutiveCommittee. Hence-
forth, the FOMC met every three weeks and assumed full responsibility for
monetary policy and its implementation by the Desk. Before 1955, the man-
ageroftheDeskreportedtothepresidentoftheNewYorkFedanditsBoardof
Directors. Upon the urging of FOMC ChairmanWilliam McChesney Martin,
at its meeting of March 2, 1955, the FOMC initiated a study that ultimately
led to making the manager responsible to the full FOMC. It is instructive to
review the language Martin used:
I have consistently endeavored to emphasize the word “System” in our
activities. To me, that is the heart and core of what we are trying to build.
If we do not work as a System, then we defeat the main purpose of our
structure, which is really unique in terms of political science. (FOMC
Minutes, 3/2/55, p. 131)
presidents changed their vote to support Martin (J. A. Erickson from Boston, W. D. Fulton from
Cleveland, and Delos C. Johns from St. Louis).
6 The letter comments on the views of Malcolm Bryan, President of the Atlanta Fed, who
argued that the FOMC should control bank reserves rather than money market conditions. Bryan
corresponded with Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago. See Hafer (1999).62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. THE WORLD’S MOST LIQUID MARKET
Sproul lost all the major battles over System governance to Martin, and he
resigned in 1956. Sproul retired and moved to California but came to New
York regularly and always included a lunch with old friends at Morgan. In
1953, Leach joined Guaranty Trust Company in New York, which merged
with J. P. Morgan in 1959. At a luncheon in early 1961, Sproul took Leach
aside and said, “I just want you to know ‘B.O.’ is dead. I’ll tell you about it
after lunch.”
After lunch Sproul came back to Leach’s ofﬁce and explained the death
of bills only. The new President, John F. Kennedy, had never met Chairman
Martin,soheinvitedhimforlunchwiththetopTreasuryappointees,Secretary
Douglas Dillon and Under Secretary Robert Roosa. Roosa had formerly been
Senior Vice President of the New York Fed and was very close to Sproul.
During the lunch, Roosa urged the abandonment of bills only.
Roosa wanted to replace it with a policy that would later be called “op-
eration twist.” In 1961, the country had two conﬂicting economic objectives.
One objective was to recover from recession. It required lower interest rates
to stimulate economic activity. The other objective was to stem gold outﬂows
that were occurring under the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange
rates.7 It required higher interest rates to attract inﬂows of foreign capital.
Roosa wanted to raise short-term interest rates and lower long-term in-
terest rates by increasing short-term debt and reducing long-term debt in the
hands of the public. The Fed would have to abandon bills only and purchase
government bonds for its portfolio. Roosa believed that the result would be
higher short-term interest rates, which would attract foreign funds, and lower
long-term interest rates, which would stimulate domestic investment and eco-
nomic activity.
Martin agreed to drop the restriction that the Fed conduct open market
operations only in short-term government securities. However, he added that
therewouldbenochangeintheFed’sbasicpolicy. TheNewYorkDeskwould
limit its intervention to correcting a disorderly market and would refrain from
guiding it in any way. He explained that the Fed depended on a free market as
an indicator of the combined judgments of investors worldwide. As it worked
out, Martin retained the essential ingredient of Fed independence in that the
Fed retained the ability to raise short-term interest rates as necessary.
The effort by the Fed to promote a competitive market in government
securities was remarkably successful. In the ﬁfties, the dealers in government
securities followed the course of action the Board staff had hoped for in its
7At the end of World War II, the United States held a large fraction of the world’s gold
reserves. It willingly allowed gold to ﬂow out. However, in 1958 the outﬂows had reduced
gold stocks to the point where the United States became concerned that its stocks could become
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1951 discussions. They made a market with guaranteed, minimal spreads
between bids and offers. Once assured of no interference by the Fed, the
market strengthened quickly. Within a very short time, the Treasury invited
the dealer community to advise on its ﬁnancing.
For forty-odd years, the market for U.S. Treasuries has been the strongest
ﬁnancial market in world history. For anyone who doubts the competitive
strengthofthemarket,Leachoffersthefollowinganecdote. Intheearly1960s,
the Treasury offered a $1 billion issue of long-term bonds on a competitive
basis. Two syndicates formed, with Morgan Guaranty Trust heading one of
them. Ordinarily, the second number after the decimal point determined the
winning bid. Leach’s recollection is that Morgan’s competitor won the bid
based on the ﬁfth digit. A difference of $100 decided a $1 billion offering!
Chairman Martin and the Federal Reserve established the dollar as the
preeminent measure of value in world markets. In the postwar period, the
dollar replaced gold and the pound sterling as the standard measure of value
worldwide. At its March 4–5, 1953, meeting, the FOMC had stated its desire
to create a market that would “reﬂect natural forces of supply and demand
and thus furnish a signal of the effectiveness of credit policy.” Over time, the
behaviorofthegovernmentbondmarketwouldbecomeanessentialingredient
in the monetary policy process. Sharp increases in bond yields often revealed
the market’s concern that inﬂation could rise.
3. CONCLUDING COMMENT
TheTreasury-FedAccord of March 1951 marked the birth of the modern Fed.
The Fed then had to grow as an institution. It grew under the guidance of
Board of Governors Chairman William McChesney Martin and capable staff
economists. The characteristics one associates with the present Federal Re-
serve System appeared at this time. They include full participation in FOMC
meetings of governors and regional Bank presidents. They also include the
pursuitofmacroeconomicstabilizationandpricelevelstabilityastherationale
for central Bank independence.
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